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Abstract
This paper investigates the supposed substitutability between equal
opportunities and public redistribution. In the ﬁrst part a theory
which ﬁnds a substitutability between redistribution and equal chances
in determining the extent of incomes inequality (Gini Index) is pre-
sented. This result is obtained including inequality of opportunities in
the labor market, and preferences for leisure in the individual utility
function. The model suggests that an optimal level of universalistic
redistribution (maximizing average utility) exists, which is increasing
with respect to inequality of opportunities. The subsequent empirical
exercises oﬀer a plausible measure of meritocracy, besides being a sup-
port for the validity of the theoretical model. Moreover, the empirical
analysis suggests that there could be countries which should enhance
redistribution and others which should reduce it, given their level of
opportunities inequality.
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1 Introduction
Inequality has several dimensions, and it can be studied and analyzed from
diﬀerent points of view. Most of them can be summarized in two large
categories: inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes (monetary
and non-monetary).
As Sen (1980) points out, while most agree that some form of equality is
desirable, there is less consensus about what should be equalized. Moreover,
there are links and interactions between various dimensions of inequality.
Inequality of opportunities aﬀects income distribution (D’Addio, 2007), while
wealth distribution can determinate the opportunities faced by pupils2. In
turn, education is a major contributor to intergenerational income mobility
(OECD, 2008).
In a context of such complex interactions, public policies aimed at to
reduce a one speciﬁc dimension of inequality must be implemented by taking
into account all the possible complementarity and/or substitutability eﬀects
of the adopted policy instruments. For example, an important debate in
public policy concerns the question of whether equal opportunities for every
one make redistributive policies unnecessary (Alesina et al, 2005). Empirical
studies on individual preferences signal that the Meltzer and Richard (1981)
approach is not suﬃcient to fully understand why people support, or do not,
income redistribution. There is a large empirical support for the hypothesis
of a substitutability between equal opportunities and income redistribution
(Fong, 2001; Benabou et al., 2001): those who believe to live in a land
of (equal) opportunities for every one do not support public redistribution.
Instead, government intervention is claimed by those who think that social
mobility is systematically biased.
People seem to agree with those philosophers of responsibility (for exam-
ple: Roemer, 2000) who claim that inequalities emerging from individual’s
responsibility should not be corrected, while it is morally fair to aim at
correcting inequalities if they derive from factors perceived as external to
individual choices.
In order to justify this attitude, part of the literature looks at the concept
of “reciprocity” (Fong 2001, Bowles et al. 2001), while Alesina et al. (2005)
focus on the fact that poor people living in a highly mobile social context
2For example because of budget constraints which limit the opportunity to achieve high
levels of education. (Becker et al., 1986; Bowles et al., 2002; Checchi, 2005)
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may be convinced that they have good prospects of increasing their incomes.
A crucial distinction must be made: income redistribution is a typical pol-
icy instrument under control of public authorities, while the extent of equal
opportunities in a society is the ﬁnal result of complex interactions between
individual preferences, cultural features, and governance instruments. Pub-
lic governments have little control on the extent of meritocracy (an eﬀective
channel is constituted by education policies)3; nevertheless they can design
more or less appropriate redistributive policies, given the level of meritocracy
in the society.
In this paper, the interactions between inequality of opportunities and
income distribution will be (theoretically and empirically) deepened. More-
over, it will be analyzed how redistributive policies should be designed, tak-
ing into account the connections between these two dimensions of inequality.
In particular, there will be a focus on universalistic redistributive policies,
even if most of the considerations made in the paper can be relevant about
redistribution on the whole.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a theoretical model will be
presented, with the aim to formally emphasize the links between inequality of
opportunities by one side and income inequality, social welfare and optimal
level of redistribution by the other side. The ﬁrst target of section 3 is to
verify the robustness of crucial relations suggested by the model. The second
one is to provide some new empirical information about meritocracy and
redistribution. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
In this section, a model which formally emphasizes the relation between equal
opportunities and income distribution is presented. Moreover, the model
framework allows to identify what should be the width of (universalistic)
redistribution which maximizes social welfare in a country with a given level
of meritocracy.
3OECD (2008) identiﬁes what kind of policies can aﬀect the extent of equal opportuni-
ties: educational policy, early childhood investment, access to health care and immigration
policy.
4Valentini E./ WP n.22 DiSSE, University of Macerata
2.1 Microeconomics
First of all, ﬁrms ad agents behavior are analyzed, in order to determine
the demands (conditionals to production) and supplies of productive factors
(capital and labor).
2.1.1 Firms
The production sector is described by a representative ﬁrm which produces
the ﬁnal good (Y ) combining labour (L) and capital (K) by a Cobb Douglas
production function: Y = KL1 , where  is the “capital share”.
This ﬁrm minimizes its costs, given a certain level of output demand (Y ).

















where r is the cost of a unit of capital and w is the wage of a unit (hour)
of labor.
2.1.2 Agents
N agents living in this economy must choose how much hours of work supply
in the labor market.
Those N individuals are diﬀerentiated: a fraction q of them shares an
equal amount k of the overall stock of capital in the economy (k = K
Nq).
The other fraction (1   q) has no capital. The ﬁrst class of agents will
be named capitalists, and workers the second one. The economy’s overall
endowment of capital depends on q (the share of population owning capital)
and k (the equal amount of capital owned by each capitalist).
I’m assuming that the model covers only the short run (labor decisions).
All the factors regarding capital at aggregate (capital stock of the economy)
and individual levels (wealth/capital distribution) are considered as exoge-
nous because they refer to the long run dynamic of the economic system.
The incomes, and consumption levels, of a capitalist and a worker are,
respectively:
yc = b + (rk + wh)(1   t) (3)
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yw = b + wh(1   t) (4)
where h is the number of working hours, t is the share of taxation on
(earned/unearned) income and b is the public transfer, equally distributed
to all individuals.
What kind of redistributive policy does the model describe? b seems to
have some features of a Basic Income, which is characterized by the followings
traits: it is paid irrespective of any other income, it does not require any
present or past work performance, it is not conditional on the willingness to
accept a job, and it is paid to individuals rather than households (Van Parijs,
1992). The problem is that most of those features can not be considered in the
model, for instance the second and the third traits. In the model there are no
“unemployed" people but two representative agents (worker and capitalist)
who can work more or less. Moreover, in the model there is not a formal
distinction between individuals and households, even if the second concept is
probably more appropriate, because agents are diﬀerentiated by the possess
of k, which can be seen as a dynastic feature.
It is possible to say that b is a universalistic transfer because it is not
dependent on work decisions and is equally distributed among all agents.
The fact that b is funded by a ﬂat income tax rate (t) allows to consider
the modelled redistribution as similar to the Negative Income Tax proposal
of Atkinson (1995), because it is fully characterized by the levels of b (Ba-
sic/Guaranteed Income) and t (tax rate).
Agents of this economy enjoy consumption and leisure. The utility func-







where 0 <  < 1 indicates agents’ preferences for consumption (and
income)4, H is the overall endowment of hours (in the rest of the model H
is normalized to one) and  > 1 is the “unequal opportunities” parameter.
It is assumed that when a worker works for x hours, he/she needs to
renounce   x hours of leisure, while a capitalist has not to sustain this
additional transaction cost. For a given level of working hours, capitalists
enjoy more free time than workers. This diﬀerence has two possible theoreti-
cal justiﬁcations. First, capital owners can beneﬁt of better Social Networks
4Moreover, 0 <  < 1 implies risk adverse individuals.
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and connections helping them to ﬁnd jobs more easily than workers without
capital (Montgomery, 1991; Calvo’-Armengol et al., 2004). Second, capital
owners can better face budget constraints driving education decisions (Becker
et al., 1986; Carneiro et al., 2002, Staﬀolani et al., 2007), and more educated
people ﬁnd jobs more easily, meeting less transaction costs (and/or are more
productive).
In other words,  > 1 can represent extra “job search costs” and/or extra
“signalling costs” (in hours) to be sustained by workers and not by capitalists.
It is necessary to remark that, in this framework, only  represents in-
equality of opportunities (deriving from possess of k), while the width of
k does not aﬀect meritocracy. The extent of k inﬂuences welfare distribu-
tion because it determines inequality in initial endowments, but it cannot be
considered as an “opportunity” parameter, since agents do not face any possi-
bility constraints. Actually, the Gini Index of the economy is not dependent
on the width of k, as it will be clariﬁed later.
Sen (2000) points out that “meritocracy may have many virtues, but
clarity is not one of them”, because “the concept of merit is deeply contingent
on our views of a good society”5. In this model it is considered a very speciﬁc
form of meritocracy, focusing on the labor market: in this case, “inequality of
opportunities” means “unequal transaction costs” arising from the fact that
some people own capital and other people do not possess it.
The presence of leisure in the utility function allows to deal with one
possible positive aspect of universalistic redistribution, as signalled by Bowles
(1992): “A further likely eﬀect would be to reduce the aggregate hours of work
and hence to reduce the importance of the consumption of commodities and
enhance the importance of free time as components of individual welfare,
thus helping to correct what Juliet Schor has termed the ‘output bias of
capitalism’, namely the structurally determined overvaluation of the things
that working for pay can secure". This topic will be deepened at the end of
the model, commenting its welfare implications.
Substituting the deﬁnitions of yc and yw in equations 5 and 6, and maxi-
mizing them with respect to h the individual labor supplies (hc and hw) are
found.









5See Roemer (2000) for a detailed description of diﬀerent meanings of “meritocracy”
and/or “inequality of opportunities”.

























while the overall capital supply is Ks = K = Nqk, as stated before.
2.2 Macroeconomics
At macro level, equilibrium conditions in the two factor markets must hold.
These conditions are:
Ld(Y;r;w) = Ls(r;w) (10)
in the labor market, and
Kd(Y;r;w) = Ks = K = Nqk (11)
in the market of capital.
There is no ‘unemployment’ in this model, since factors markets clear.
However, incomes are diﬀerentiated because capitalists earn no labor income
and because the two representative agents (worker and capitalist) can be in-
duced to work more or less, according to transaction costs and redistributive
policies.
Assuming perfect competition and zero proﬁts for ﬁrms, in the ﬁnal mar-
ket the amount of Y (production, national income) must be equivalent to
the demand of the N agents:
[w(Y;t;b)Ld(Y;r;w) + r(Y;t;b)K](1   t) + bN = Y (12)
In equation 12, there is another assumption of the model: both workers
and capitalists allocate all the income to consumption. This fact, along with
the public budget constraint, means that, in this framework, universalistic
redistribution simply redistributes incomes produced by work and capital. It
does not generate an extra-income, for instance enhancing aggregate demand
because of the greater propensity to consumption of the poorest (in this
model, the workers).
Finally, the following public budget constraint must hold:
[w(Y;t;b)Ld(Y;r;w) + r(Y;t;b)K]t = bN (13)
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2.3 Solutions
The system involving equations 10, 11, 12 and 13 has four equations and
is solvable for the following four unknowns: w, r, Y and b, which will be
function of t. In fact, the system has explicit solutions in b(t), but not in
t(b); hence, in the rest of the paper, t will be considered as the policy variable.
By solving the system, it is possible to obtain the following results:






























































These solutions make clear the meaning of t in this model: it repre-
sents the share of average income per capita constituted by universalistic
transfers. In the rest of the paper, there will be a focus on y(t) =
Y (t)
N .
Theoretically, given universalistic redistribution, an agent with the average
income per capita (y(t)) should pay to government exactly the amount she/he
receives by b. Actually, in the model there are no agents earning the aver-
age income, because capitalists have an income always over the average and
workers always under (as we will see formally later).
Before to inspect other results of the model, it is useful to analyze the
relation between b and t, using equation 17. It emerges (see Appendix A,
Proof 1) that b(t) is initially increasing in t, until t = b (see equation ii in
Appendix A), while is decreasing over this threshold. Hence, the revenues
of t, and consequently b(t), are aﬀected by a “Laﬀer eﬀect”: if t is too high,
demotivating eﬀects of taxation predominate.
In the model the level of k (capital owned by every capitalist) has the
expected implications: per capita average income is increasing in k, r(t) is
decreasing in k and w(t) is increasing in k. Moreover, it is easily possible to
proof that in this model  always represents the capital share, which is not
dependent on taxation.
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Figure 1: Per capita incomes




In the two following sections, model results will be analyzed: ﬁrst, the
overall production and income distribution are considered, then there will be
a focus on welfare considerations. In particular, the implications of diﬀerent
levels of t and  will be commented.
2.4 Overall income and its distribution
From equation 16 it clearly emerges that the overall production (and per
capita income) is decreasing in t. This result derives from the fact that,
in this framework, universalistic redistribution does not enhance aggregate
demand, while it demotivates labor supply. Substituting w(t) and r(t) in











which is clearly decreasing in t.
6The amount of L employed in equilibrium it is straightforward derivable from equation
16, considering that Y = L1 K and K = Nqk.
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While average income is always decreasing in t, and the same holds for
capitalists income yc(t) (see Appendix A, Proof 2), the workers income, yw(t),
has a maximum in t (see Appendix A, Proof 3), which will be named yw,
and this threshold is greater then zero if   1 
q( 1)+1
7. If this condition
holds, model implications about incomes can generically be represented as in
Figure 1, otherwise yw is negative and also yw(t) is always decreasing in t8.
Turning on the eﬀects of , equation 16 highlights that average income
is always decreasing in . Actually,  > 1 can be considered as a proxy
of transaction costs to be faced in the labour market by those who do not
possess capital: their reduction would be beneﬁcial for the economic system
on the whole. Moreover, w(t) is increasing in  and the opposite holds for
r(t).
While yw(t) is always decreasing in  (Proof 4), yc(t) initially decreases
with , but it begins to raise after a certain value of , hence it has a minimum
in  (Proof 5). If  is over this threshold, capitalists lose because of the lower
r(t), but they beneﬁt of the increased w(t), and they replace with their work
the lower labor supply of the workers. Despite the lower overall production
and average income, the overall gain of capitalist is possible because it is
very low and because the declining of y(t) with respect to  is marginally
decreasing. In addition, both average income and workers income tend to
stabilize for high ; in particular, workers income tends to the value of the
basic income b(t) (they do not work, because of high transaction costs, and
their income is only constituted by the public transfer).
The Gini Index of this economy is:
g(t) =








1 + q(   1)
(19)
which is always decreasing in t and increasing in . Moreover, it is not
dependent on k; the distribution of the overall capital (K) aﬀects incomes
inequality only trough q and .
Individuals can consider public redistribution as a substitute of equal
opportunities because of “reciprocity” concerns (Fong, 2001) or because mer-
7In words, there exists a yw greater than zero if the preference for consumption () is
greater than a given threshold which is decreasing in the capital share (), in the share of
capitalists (q) and in inequality of opportunities ().
8More precisely, ﬁgure 1 refers to a framework with  = 0:5,  = 0:4 (capital share),
q = 0:5, and  = 3. k does not aﬀect the lines shapes, as it is clear, for example, looking
at equation viii in Appendix A.







itocracy oﬀers better prospects for people with low income (Alesina et al.
2005). This kind of preferences for redistribution ﬁnds a corresponding fea-
ture at macro level in the opposite eﬀects of redistribution (t) and inequality
of opportunities () on the extent of income inequality.
It is useful to highlight that
 = 1 ) g(t) = (1   q)(1   t)
In case of fully equal opportunities, the Gini index is simply proportional to
 (capital share),  (preference for income) and 1   q (share of workers),
while it is decreasing in t.
2.5 Welfare
In Appendix A, it is shown that individual utility of capitalists Uc(t) is always
decreasing in t (Proof 6), while workers utility Uw(t) and average welfare U(t)
have two diﬀerent (always positive) maximums in t (respectively, uw and u,
Proofs 7 and 8).
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The level of taxation, and redistribution, which maximizes average welfare
(u), is always increasing in  (Proof 9). Again, public redistribution and
equal opportunities can be considered as substitutes even under a welfare
point of view: higher inequality of opportunities require higher taxation and
redistribution. In the case of fully equal opportunities, the optimal taxation
is t = 0.
Model implications about welfare and t can generically be represented
as in ﬁgure 29. The eﬀects of t on average utility mainly pass trough a
redistribution of individual h and, hence, of leisure: hw(t) is always decreasing
in t (as it is clear from equation v in Appendix A), while
dhc(t)
dt can be positive





dt : if also capitalists working hours decrease in t, they
decrease more slowly than workers ones10.
An interesting result of the model is to show that, if leisure preferences
are taken into account, there exists a positive level of (universalistic) redis-
tribution and taxation which maximizes social welfare, even diminishing per
capita incomes. This result is consistent with the Bowles (1992) suggestion:
universalistic redistribution can improve average welfare reducing the impor-
tance of the consumption of commodities and enhancing the importance of
free time.
Moreover, the model highlights that the optimal level of taxation is in-
creasing in opportunities inequality ().
3 Empirical exercises
The most relevant implications of the theoretical model are summed up by:
 the relation between model parameters by one side (paying particular
attention to ) and the Gini Index of the economy on the other side
(equation 19), because it synthetises how incomes are formed in the
described economy;
 the optimal level of universalistic redistribution and taxation (equation
xvi in Appendix A), increasing in , because it synthetises the welfare
implications of the model.
9More precisely, ﬁgure 2 refers to the same framework of ﬁgure 1, with  = 0:5,  = 0:4
(capital share), q = 0:5, and  = 3. k does not aﬀect the lines shapes, as it is clear, for
example, looking at equation xvi in Appendix A.
10See Proof 10 in Appendix A.
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In this section some empirical exercises are executed with the aim to verify
the robustness of the model, deepening the realism of those two relations.
3.1 Gini index and meritocracy
Let’s start with the study of equation 19. Assume to have proxies (e x) for the
real level of t, for the Gini Index, and for the model parameters, except for
. Solving equation 19 with respect to  gives:
b  =
1 +
e g e e (1 e t)
e q(1 e e t)
1  
e g
(1 e q)(1 e e t)
(20)
Now, I try to “estimate” the b  implied by the model for a set of OECD
countries, using the following proxies11:
 e g: gini indexes provided by OECD (2008)12;
 e  = 1   l: where l is the Labour Income Share provided by OECD13;
 e q = 1   GW: where GW is the Wealth Gini, provided by Davies et al.
(2006)14. Given k and K = Nqk, K is shared between the q fraction
of the population. The higher is q, the fewer the inequality of capital’s
distribution. Obviously, “capital” is diﬀerent from “wealth”, but e q could
be considered a good proxy of the meaning of k in the model (its possess
guarantees no labor earnings and best access to labour market);
 e t: household taxes expressed as a share of household disposable as given
in OECD (2008); data refer to Mid 2000s. Obviously, this proxy can
describe the extent of redistribution but not of universalistic redistribu-
tion, but it remains the best available resource;
 e : ﬁnally, it is not easy to approximate .
– First, I try to calibrate the model.
It is not possible to observe , but it is possible to ﬁnd a proxy
for the mean share of working hours (h(t))15 and use it to go back
to a plausible value of e . I approximate the mean share of time
11The full dataset is reported in Appendix C.
12Data refer to mid-2000s
13http://stats.oecd.org, data refer to year 2005.
14Data refer to year 2000.
15Remember that the overall endowments of hours is normalized to 1.
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dedicated to work (e h) dividing the annual working hours provided
by OECD (2009)16 by the total annual hours (8760). From the def-
initions of hc(t) and hw(t)17, and substituting the relation between
Gini Index and  (equation 20) it is easy to obtain
h(t) = qhc(t) + (1   q)hw(t) = 
(1   )(1   t)
(1   t) +
g (1 t)
q





e t + (1   e t)

1 e 
e h + e 
e q
 (21)
In other words, I’m calibrating the model using proxies for q,  and
t, plus the observed Gini Index and the actually worked hours, to
go back to the “unobservable”  and 18.
– Secondly, I get data from the last wave (2008)19 of the World Values
Survey. In particular I use the question “How important it is leisure
in your life?”, which possible answers range from 1 (very important)
to 4 (not all important). I consider the mean value answered in each
country (obviously, divided by 4), as a proxy of  (e wvs);
– Real Business Cycle literature deals with preferences on consump-
tion and leisure, and with the tradeoﬀ between them. With regard
to developed countries, the weight of consumption in the utility
function (our ) is often rounded, more or less, to 0.35(e rbc)20.
It is useful to signal that, for all the countries, the following relation holds:
e rbc < e wvs < e cal. Therefore, the three proxies of e  can be considered as
three generic scenarios: low, middle and high preferences for consumption.
Applying those proxies to equation 20, the “estimated” b  are those shown
in Table 1, where countries are ranked by the one with more equal opportu-
nities to the less meritocratic one, according to the values of b cal. Otherwise,
it is interesting that the estimated b  highlights an high degree of qualitative
16Data refer to 2005.
17Equations iii and v in Appendix A
18The values of e cal are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B.
19Data refer to 2005-2007.
20See Kydland et al. (1982), Cooley et al. (1995), Backus et al. (1995).
15Valentini E./ WP n.22 DiSSE, University of Macerata
Table 1: Estimated b 
Country b cal b wvs b rbc
(e cal) (e wvs) (e rbc = 0:35)
Slovak Republic 2.27 2.54
Luxembourg 2.35 2.41 2.52
Czech Republic 2.55 2.74
Netherlands 2.87 2.89 2.90
Norvay 2.87 2.97
Sweden 2.94 2.93 2.93
Finland 2.94 2.97 2.97
France 3.00 3.06 3.12
Austria 3.06 3.02
Australia 3.18 3.27 3.30
Belgium 3.32 3.20
South Korea 3.40 3.45 3.54
Switzerland 3.43 3.53 3.56
Canada 3.45 3.53 3.57
Denmark 3.49 3.08
Germany 3.72 3.68 3.60
New Zealand 3.72 3.88 3.91
Ireland 3.75 3.88
Japan 3.91 3.97 4.00
UK 4.04 4.04 4.04
Poland 5.23 5.03 4.96
USA 5.32 5.45 5.47
Italy 5.68 5.26 5.01
homogeneity between the results obtained by the assumption of e cal and the
ones obtained with e wvs. Only the relative rank of Italy and USA changes.
Also e rbc gives similar results (except for Denmark)21.
How much arbitrary are coeﬃcients in table 1? A good way to test their
realism is to compare them with an other available measure of inequality of
opportunities.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity can be considered as logically com-
parable with , because in the model  represents labour market extra trans-
action costs which must be faced by agents without capital. This exogenous
endowment of capital can be seen as a dynastic feature. In other words, both
21The e  of UK is not exactly the same in the three frameworks, but it exhibits few
changes: its values are 4.035 (Cal), 4.041 (Wvs) and 4.043 (Rbc).
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.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity
Regression results, dependent variable: b cal
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P > jtj
Earnings Elasticity 4.88 1.60 3.04 0.014
Intercept 2.23 .53 4.23 0.002
N = 11, F(1;9) = 9:25, P > jFj = 0:01, R2 = 0:51.
b  and Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity can be considered as proxies for
opportunities inequality.
OECD (2008) furnishes homogenous and comparable estimates of inter-
generational elasticities: the comparison between them and b  values in Table
1 gives the results shown in Figure 3, which refers to the case with b cal. The
results obtained using b wvs and b rbc are almost equivalent (see Table in Ap-
pendix B).
Despite the fact that a low number of countries can be included in the
analysis, its results seem to suggest a robust relation between b  emerging
from the model and intergenerational earnings elasticity. This fact allows to
consider as realistic the ranking in Table 1 and constitutes a relevant element
in support of the theoretical model.
Moreover, the analysis presented here reinforces the picture given by
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OECD(2008) data on inequality of opportunities in USA22: with regard to the
“land of opportunities”, a puzzle emerges about the divergence between em-
pirical analyses and people perceptions on inequality of opportunities (Fong,
2001; Alesina et al. 2005).
3.2 Optimal taxation and redistribution
Assuming b  as a good proxy of the real , it is now possible to compute
what should be the optimal rate of taxation and redistribution ( b 
u), given
the level of inequality of opportunities, as a function of e , e q, e  and b  (using
equation xvi in Appendix A).
Moreover, comparing b 
u with the eﬀective level of taxation e t it is possible
to obtain the absolute error in taxation
tgap = e t   b 
u





which is not dependent on the “quality” of the error (too much or too less
taxation) and it is useful for the successive empirical analysis.
Table 2 shows which countries are likely to tax and redistribute too much
(tgap > 0) and which countries should enhance redistribution (tgap < 0), given
their levels of inequality opportunities (b ).
Before to comment Table 2 it is necessary to verify the realism of the b 
u
deﬁnition, since Table 2 is computed assuming it as realistic and because this
would be another test of the model robustness.
With the aim to test if the optimal level of taxation identiﬁed by the model
can actually be considered a proxy of the one maximizing average utility, I run
a regression with the average “satisfaction with life” as dependent variable23
and %tgap as regressor24.
Table 3 shows analyses conducted using the three speciﬁcations of e .
22See Pistolesi (2009) for a further investigation.
23Source: last wave of the World Values Survey. Data refer to 2005-2007. The question
used is: “All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?”
and answers go from 1(dissatisﬁed) to 10 (satisﬁed).
24In this empirical analysis I ﬁnd more appropriate to use the relative error %tgap, but
the results are almost the same using the absolute value of tgap.
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Table 2: Actual and Optimal Taxation
b cal b wvs b rbc
Country e t c 
u tgap %tgap c 
u tgap %tgap c 
u tgap %tgap
Australia .234 .343 -.109 .319 .383 -.149 .389 .398 -.164 .412
Austria .334 .308 .026 .086 .335 -.001 .003
Belgium .383 .329 .054 .166 .359 .024 .067
Canada .258 .354 -.096 .272 .398 -.140 .351 .422 -.164 .388
Czech Republic .216 .284 -.068 .239 .341 -.125 .367
Denmark .525 .310 .216 .696 .336 .189 .564
Finland .301 .313 -.012 .039 .339 -.038 .112 .352 -.051 .145
France .260 .311 -.051 .164 .329 -.069 .210 .350 -.090 .257
Germany .355 .360 -.005 .014 .371 -.016 .042 .393 -.038 .097
Ireland .194 .391 -.197 .504 .451 -.257 .570
Italy .302 .405 -.103 .253 .442 -.140 .317 .470 -.168 .358
Japan .197 .388 -.191 .493 .427 -.230 .539 .452 -.255 .564
Luxembourg .238 .301 -.063 .210 .319 -.081 .254 .351 -.113 .321
Netherlands .247 .316 -.069 .219 .328 -.081 .247 .333 -.086 .257
New Zealand .290 .380 -.090 .236 .477 -.187 .391 .495 -.205 .414
Norvay .332 .358 -.026 .072 .414 -.082 .198
Poland .277 .391 -.114 .292 .470 -.192 .410 .511 -.234 .458
S. Korea .080 .300 -.220 .734 .315 -.235 .746 .348 -.268 .770
Slovak Republic .200 .305 -.105 .343 .376 -.176 .468
Sweden .432 .289 .144 .498 .322 .110 .342 .326 .106 .325
Switzerland .360 .314 .046 .147 .362 -.002 .006 .378 -.018 .048
UK .241 .357 -.116 .324 .392 -.151 .385 .406 -.165 .407
USA .256 .359 -.103 .286 .450 -.194 .431 .394 -.101 .344
The results seem to suggest that the optimal level of taxation identiﬁed
by the model can actually describe some features of the real world. Like
in the previous analysis on intergenerational income elasticity and e  (see
Appendix B), the framework with e rbc seems to be the best one to conform
to the empirical data.
This fact allows to brieﬂy comment Table 2. With the aim of summing up
the informations of Table 2, countries are split in four categories in Table 4,
which is built-up assuming that the empirical analysis can be a rough outline
of the real world under a quantitative point of view, but it can provide an
interesting information under a qualitative perspective.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the substitutability between public redistribution and
equal opportunities, as supposed by Alesina et al. (2005) and Fong (2001).
“Inequality” is a complex concept, where diﬀerent dimensions overlap each
other (Sen, 1980). Public government can have much control over some fea-
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Table 3: Tax Error (%tgap) and average Satisfaction with Life







Constant 7:75 7:84 7:93
(0:21) (0:22) (0:23)
N=16 N=16 N=16
F(1;14) = 3:76 F(1;14) = 5:44 F(1;14) = 6:40
P > jFj = 0:07 P > jFj = 0:035 P > jFj = 0:02
R2 = 0:21 R2 = 0:28 R2 = 0:31
Standard errors in brackets.
Signiﬁcance: ?: 10%, ??: 5%, ? ? ?: 1%.
Table 4: Summary
Countries that, given their level of meritocracy, exhibit...
...a very too high level tgap > 0
of taxation and %tgap > 0:50 Denmark
redistribution
...a too high level tgap > 0
of taxation and 0:25 < %tgap < 0:50 Sweden
redistribution
...the optimal level Austria, Belgium, Finland,
of taxation and %tgap < 0:25 France, Germany, Luxembourg,
redistribution Netherlands, Norvay, Switzerland
...a too low level tgap < 0 Australia, Canada, Czech Republic,
of taxation and 0:25 < %tgap < 0:50 Italy, New Zealand, Poland,
redistribution Slovak Republic, UK, USA
...a very too low level tgap < 0
of taxation and %tgap > 0:50 Ireland, Japan, South Korea
redistribution
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tures of inequality, like the ﬁnal distribution of incomes, using appropriate
redistributive policies. On the contrary, the degree of inequality of oppor-
tunities is a social product, determined by individual behaviors, formal and
informal institutional features (for example: culture), and, ﬁnally, by public
policies. OECD (2008) sums up what kind of policies can aﬀect the extent
to which the social and economic position of individuals in society is deter-
mined by their skills and ambitions rather than by inherited characteristics:
educational policy, early childhood investment, access to health care and
immigration policy.
In this paper the policies that could enhance meritocracy are not studied.
It is simply deepened how the presence of a certain level of inequality of
opportunities in the society should lead governments to design appropriate
redistributive policies.
The theory presented in the ﬁrst part, including inequality of opportuni-
ties and preferences for leisure, ﬁnds a substitutability between redistribution
and equal chances in determining the extent of incomes inequality (Gini In-
dex). Moreover, the model suggests that there exists an optimal level of
universalistic redistribution (maximizing average utility), which is increasing
in inequality of opportunities.
The empirical exercises, besides being a support for the validity of the
theoretical model, oﬀer a plausible measure of meritocracy (Table 1) and
suggest that, given their level of inequality of opportunities, there could
be countries which should enhance redistribution and others which should
reduce it. On the whole, in developed economies, income redistribution seems
to be lower than the one required by the extent of inequality of opportunities.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof 1 : b(t) has a maximum in t
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The second, the third and the fourth elements of this product have a positive
sign. Only the ﬁrst element can be positive or negative. Solving:
(1   )(1   t)
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 0 if t  b =
2
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which is greater than one (proof available from the author).
Proof 2 : Capitalists income is always decreasing in t
First of all, it is necessary to compute hc(t) substituting b(t) (equation 17),
r(t) (equation 15) and w(t) (equation 14) in the deﬁnition of hc (equation





















Now, yc(t) is computable substituting hc(t) (equation iii), b(t) (equation 17),
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which is clearly always decreasing in t.
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Proof 3 : Workers income has a maximum in t
First of all, it is necessary to compute hw(t) substituting b(t) (equation 17)














Now, yw(t) is computable substituting hw(t) (equation v), b(t) (equation 17)
and w(t) (equation 14) in equation 4:
yw(t) =
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where the second, the third and the fourth elements have a positive sign.
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It is easy to proof that yw  0 if   1 
q( 1)+1.

























which is ever greater than one (proof available from the author).
23Valentini E./ WP n.22 DiSSE, University of Macerata
Proof 4 : Workers income is always decreasing in 






























which is always negative.
Proof 5 : Capitalists income has a minimum in 


































































Proof 6 : Capitalists welfare is always decreasing in t
Capitalists utility is easily computable substituting equations iii and iv
in equation 5, and it results to be:
Uc(t) =
q + (1   q)[(1   t)   tq(   1)]
[1    [ + t(1   )]]




where A is a positive parameters combination not dependent on t:







1 + q(   1)
#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t(1   t)(1 ) 1(1   )(1   )
[1    [ + t(1   )]]
2   A

  + q(   1)
1   
(1   t)(1   q)
t
1    [ + t(1   )]
1   
+ (1   q) [(1   t) + tq] + q [1   t(1   q)]

which is always negative.
Proof 7 : Workers welfare has a maximum in t
Workers utility is easily computable substituting equations v and vi in
equation 6, and it results to be:
Uw(t) =
1    [(1   t)   tq(   1)]
[1    [ + t(1   )]]
1  (1   t)
(1 )  A (x)





q(   1) +   
t(1   )(1   )[1    [(1   t)   tq(   1)]]





[1    [ + t(1   )]]
1   A
where only the the ﬁrst element can be positive or negative. Solving:
q(   1) +   
t(1   )(1   )[1    [(1   t)   tq(   1)]]
(1   t)[1    [ + t(1   )]]
 0 (xi)
and deﬁning:

































It is easy to proof that uw is always greater than zero.


















which is always greater than one (proof available from the author).
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Proof 8 : Average welfare has a maximum in t
The average utility is given by:
U(t) = qUc(t) + (1   q)Uw(t) (xiii)
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where x is a negative number: for our analysis, it is suﬃcient to consider
t  u, and it is easy to proof that u is always positive and minor than one.
Finally, considering equation xiii and that
dUc(t)
dt is always negative, it is
easy to conclude that u < uw.
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Proof 9 : Optimal taxation, u, is increasing in 















where the ﬁrst element is negative (the ﬁrst addend in parenthesis is minor
than one) and
dC()
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
where the ﬁrst element is always positive, while the second one have all
negative addends.
Proof 10 : Dynamics of hc(t) and hw(t) with respect to t





dt from equation iii, it results:
dhc(t)
dt
= [[1   (1   q)]   q]
(1   )[1 + q(   1)]
q [1   t   (1   t)]
2
where the ﬁrst element determines the expression’s sign and it results that:
dhc(t)
dt




Even in the case
dhc(t)
dt < 0, computing
dhw(t)







if (1   ) > 0
and this condition is always satisﬁed.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table 5: e cal
Australia .53 Luxembourg .49
Austria .52 Netherlands .42
Belgium .54 New Zealand .65
Canada .57 Norvay .52
Czech Republic .55 Poland .69
Denmark .66 S. Korea .54
Finland .53 Slovak Republic .52
France .52 Sweden .60
Germany .52 Switzerland .65
Ireland .51 UK .56
Italy .60 USA .74
Japan .53 Mean .57
Table 6: Comparing b  and Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity (2)
Regression results, dependent variable: b wvs
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P > jtj
Earnings Elasticity 4.85 1.87 2.60 0.036
Intercept 2.19 .66 3.30 0.013
N = 9, F(1;7) = 6:74, P > jFj = 0:04, R2 = 0:49.
Regression results, dependent variable: b rbc
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P > jtj
Earnings Elasticity 4.54 1.37 3.31 0.009
Intercept 2.28 .45 5.05 0.001
N = 11, F(1;9) = 10:93, P > jFj = 0:009, R2 = 0:54.
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Appendix C: Dataset
Gini Wealth Labour Household Intergen. Satisfaction Annual
Index Gini Share Taxes Income with Life Preferences Hours
Elasticity
e g GW l e t e wvs
e q = 1   Gw e  = 1   l e h = hours
8760
Australia .301 .622 .605 .234 .16 7.3 .4 1732
Austria .265 .644 .692 .334 . . . 1652
Belgium .271 .66 .673 .383 . . . 1565
Canada .317 .663 .601 .258 .19 7.8 .43 1738
Czech Republic .268 .624 .613 .216 . . . 2002
Denmark .232 .765 .685 .525 .15 . . 1556
Finland .269 .621 .641 .301 .18 7.8 .41 1718
France .281 .73 .671 .26 .41 6.9 .44 1559
Germany .298 .671 .666 .355 .32 7.1 .47 1435
Ireland .328 .581 .572 .194 . . . 1654
Italy .352 .609 .669 .302 .48 6.9 .46 1819
Japan .321 .547 .576 .197 . 7 .42 1775
Luxembourg .258 .649 .549 .238 . 7.9 .44 1570
Netherlands .271 .649 .671 .247 . 7.8 .37 1362
New Zealand .335 .651 .496 .29 . 7.9 .4 1827
Norvay .276 .633 .517 .332 .17 . . 1417
Poland .372 .656 .567 .277 . 7 .47 1983
S. Korea .312 .579 .767 .08 . 6.4 .48 2364
Slovak Republic .268 .627 .502 .2 . . . 1708
Sweden .234 .776 .675 .432 .27 7.7 .38 1575
Switzerland .276 .803 .659 .36 . 8 .43 1669
UK .335 .697 .701 .241 .5 7.6 .41 1676
USA .381 .801 .66 .256 .47 7.3 .43 1795
Mean .2959 .6634 .6299 .2935 .3 7.4 .43 1706
Gini Index - source: OECD (2008); years: mid-2000s.
Wealth Gini - source: Davies et al. (2006), research of the United Nations
University; year: 2000.
Labour share - source: http://stats.oecd.org; year: 2005.
Household taxes - source: OECD (2008); years: mid-2000s.
Intergenerational Income Elasticity - source: OECD (2008); years: early
2000s.
Satisfaction with Life - source: World Values Survey, last wave (2008);
years: 2005-2007, “All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life
as a whole these days?”, 1(dissatisﬁed) - 10 (satisﬁed).
Preferences - source: World Values Survey, last wave (2008); years: 2005-
2007. "How important it is leisure in your life?", 1 (very important) - 4 (not
all important), e wvs = mean
4 .
Annual Hours (of work) - source: OECD(2009); year 2005.
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